The Cologne Protocols, Part 3: The Overload Alarmism — The Hospitals That Were Never Full · ELIZA on Steroids

Table of Contents

The Cologne Protocols - This article is part of a series.

Part 1: The Cologne Protocols, Part 1: They Knew — And Did It Anyway

Part 2: The Cologne Protocols, Part 2: The Children Who Were Never at Risk — And They Knew It

Part 3: This Article

Part 4: The Cologne Protocols, Part 4: The Incidence Machine — Testing Without Reason, Numbers Without Meaning

Part 5: The Cologne Protocols, Part 5: Vaccination Pressure at the Municipal Level — And the Forgotten Side Effects

The fear of a collapsing healthcare system, of overcrowded intensive care units and triage decisions, shaped the public debate during the coronavirus pandemic. The Cologne Corona Protocols now reveal how this narrative was assessed internally — and that reality often told a different story.

“Emergency Rooms at Their Limit” — with 13 positive cases
#

As early as March 4, 2020, the day of the first session of the Cologne crisis team, it was recorded:

“Emergency rooms in clinics are already at their limit.”

At this point, there were only 13 positively tested individuals in Cologne, a city of over a million inhabitants. COVID could not have been responsible for this strain. Emergency rooms were at capacity — as they are every winter. Nevertheless, the threatening backdrop of overload was constructed.

Insolvencies Due to Low Occupancy
#

A few weeks later, on March 30, 2020, an entry appears that starkly contradicts public warnings:

“Insolvencies are to be expected as service chains will break down due to lower hospital occupancy.”

The problem was not overload due to COVID cases. Instead, it was lower occupancy due to postponed operations and treatments. Clinics faced bankruptcy — not because they were too full, but because they were too empty.

In the same protocol, it was noted:

“Avoid collateral damage. Nice-to-have treatments are not necessary. Treatment of tumor patients, however, is.”

Tumor treatments had to be explicitly emphasized as necessary — in a situation where supposedly the pandemic was pushing the healthcare system to its limits.

The “Golden Year” and “Hero Overload Alarmism”
#

This internal assessment is confirmed by external sources. Johannes Wolff, head of hospital remuneration at the GKV (National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds), referred to 2020 as the “golden year of hospital financing.” The reason: an enormous decline in hospital cases compared to 2019, while federal compensation payments for reserved beds continued in full.

In an internal email published by Bastian Barucker from the GKV, the term “hero overload alarmism” was used. The overload was internally recognized as a narrative — and was maintained nonetheless.

The Communication Strategy
#

The discrepancy between internal assessment and public communication was no coincidence. It was part of a strategy described in the strategy paper of the Federal Ministry of the Interior from March 2020. Among other things, it stated that the population needed to be presented with the “worst-case scenario” to secure acceptance of the measures.

The Cologne protocols show: at the municipal level, the exaggeration was recognized. But they went along — because the directives came from above and because lockstep was more important than local reality.

Conclusion
#

The narrative of overwhelmed hospitals was a central element of pandemic communication. The Cologne Protocols and other internal documents show: this narrative was often not supported by reality. Internally, the discrepancy was known. Clinics faced insolvency due to low occupancy, while the public was warned of overload.

The “hero overload alarmism” was not an oversight. It was an instrument.

This is Part 3 of “The Cologne Protocols” series. Upcoming parts: The incidence machine. And the vaccination pressure at the municipal level.

Sources: